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OPINION OF THE COURT
           
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
The promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
ushered in a new era of federal litigation, directed to the goal of
securing “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.  It would be
reasonable to expect, in light of all the applicable rules and
governing precedents, that experienced attorneys, especially
those who have handled major litigation, would be able to
proceed through the discovery and pretrial stages with a
conciliatory attitude and a minimum of obstruction, and that,
under the guiding hand of the district court, the path to ultimate
disposition would be a relatively smooth one.  The record of the
case before us shows exactly the opposite.  The parties were
unable to reach agreement on even minor matters and the
discovery was noncompliant, delayed, or protracted, leading to
the District Court’s entry of the sanction orders that are the
subject of these appeals.  We conclude, without enthusiasm, that
none of the players is without responsibility for the unfortunate
state of affairs that developed, but we view with particular
concern the lawyers’ attitude and conduct toward the district
judge who, if given more cooperation, would undoubtedly have
been able to preside more effectively.
I.
Factual Background
 Three officers of the corporate Defendants, James M.1
Mead (Capital), John S. Brouse (Highmark), and Joseph Pfister
(Keystone), were also named as Defendants, but were not
sanctioned and are not parties to this appeal.
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Keystone Health Plan Central, Inc., (“Keystone”), Capital
Blue Cross (“Capital”), and Highmark Inc., (“Highmark”),
together with three law firms that represented them in the class
action law suit in the District Court, Hangley Aronchick Segal &
Pudin, and its partner John S. Summers, and Stevens & Lee,
P.C., its partners Jeffrey D. Bukowski and Daniel B. Huyett, and
Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, LLP, and its partner, Sandra
A. Girifalco, appeal two District Court orders imposing
sanctions and the order denying the motion to vacate.
Natalie M. Grider, M.D., and her medical practice,
Kutztown Family Medicine, P.C., filed the class action
underlying this appeal on October 5, 2001, in Pennsylvania state
court on behalf of a state-wide class of doctors and medical
practices (“Plaintiffs”) that were medical “providers with the
Keystone health maintenance organization.” Grider v. Keystone
Health Plan Central, Inc., 500 F.3d 322, 324 (3d Cir. 2007). 
Plaintiffs alleged that Keystone failed to pay, or underpaid,
Plaintiffs for medical services provided to Keystone’s
policyholders, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.,
and Pennsylvania’s “prompt pay” statute, 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 991.2101 et seq.  Grider, 500 F.3d at 323.  Plaintiffs also
named as Defendants Capital and Highmark, each of which
owned 50% of Keystone when the suit was filed, but now a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Capital.   Defendants removed the1
case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania on November 7, 2001.
The firm Hangley, Aronchick, Segal & Pudin and
attorney Summers (together, “Hangley”) represented Keystone
from October 2003 to July 2006.  The firm Stradley, Ronon,
Stevens & Young LLP and attorney Girifalco (together,
 “A ‘capitation’ is ‘an annual fee paid a doctor or medical2
group for each patient enrolled in a health plan.’” App. at 66 n.17
(quoting Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 332 (1968)).
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“Stradley”) represented Highmark from January 2004 until at
least July 24, 2007.  The firm Stevens & Lee, P.C., and attorneys
Bukowski and Huyett (together, “Stevens & Lee”) represented
Capital in these proceedings until October 3, 2006.
A.  Discovery
Discovery began in 2003 and ended five years later with
the parties’ settlement in February 2008.  The process involved
District Judge James Knoll Gardner, Magistrate Judge Arnold C.
Rapoport, and Special Discovery Master Karolyn Vreeland
Blume. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on January
23, 2002.  On December 19, 2002, the case was transferred to
the Honorable James Knoll Gardner, who granted in part, and
denied in part, the motion on September 18, 2003.  It appears
that the plaintiffs made no discovery requests during that time,
filing their first such request (which was related to class
certification) in September 2003.  Defendants entered into a
joint-defense agreement sometime between October and the end
of December 2003 and, as the District Court found, Summers
(representing Keystone) “took the lead in defending this case on
behalf of all defendants and their counsel,” App. at 75, a
statement Stradley denies.
Between 2003 and 2005, proceedings and conferences
concerning discovery and other matters were held before
Magistrate Judge Arnold C. Rapoport, to whom the District
Court delegated such matters.  Plaintiffs served five sets of
discovery requests “directed to all defendants,”  App. at 8977,
seeking information regarding subjects such as “capitation,
provider reimbursement, complaints by providers about
reimbursement and information concerning the elements that
would be required to be proved for class certification.”  App. at
75.   Highmark estimates that the total number of requests it2
alone received (counting subparts) was over 422.
 For example, Highmark claims that it “produced hundreds3
of thousands of documents, and responded to dozens of
interrogatories.”  Highmark Br. at 11.  Although Highmark cites a
span of appendix pages to support its position, those pages are its
responses to document requests/interrogatories and do not make
clear that it sent documents or how many it sent.
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Highmark, Keystone and Capital responded to each
request.  They interposed general objections to many of
Plaintiffs’ discovery requests.  Those objections included
that Plaintiffs sought privileged or confidential material, that the
requests were vague and/or overly broad, and that Plaintiffs
sought documents not in Defendants’ possession or whose
production would impose on Defendants undue burden or
expense.
In addition to these general objections, each Defendant
responded with specific objections to some of Plaintiffs’
individual requests, such as objections on the same grounds as
the general objections described above or on the ground that it
had already responded to such a request in an earlier response. 
In addition, Defendants raised objections to the “definitions and
instructions,” claiming that Plaintiffs’ use of terms in their
requests was vague - such as using “the term ‘Defendant’ . . .
without specifying to which defendant they are referring.”  App.
at 7281.  Defendants assert that they produced documents
despite these objections.   Defendants’ responses span from3
December 2003 to November 2004.
As provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, Judge
Gardner held a status conference in January 2004 and at that
time set discovery deadlines.  The bickering among the parties
ensured that the deadlines would not be met.  Although the
parties conferred frequently about discovery issues, the principal
issues were not resolved. Plaintiffs requested that Defendants
withdraw their general objections and Defendants repeatedly
declined to do so.  In addition, Keystone denied having the
claims data, which was critical discovery information, requested
by Plaintiffs or the ability to obtain such data from Synertech, its
 Apart from those appealed here, the remaining sanctions4
motions were never ruled on by the District Court, and were
withdrawn by court order in connection with the subsequent
settlement.
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claims processor and a subsidiary of Keystone.  Highmark
advised Plaintiffs that it did not have Keystone’s claims
processing documents because it did not itself process such
claims.  Similarly, Highmark and Capital claimed not to possess
documents related to audits of Keystone, but both parties
eventually produced such documents at the last minute or late,
years after plaintiffs’ initial requests and not until after the
appointment of the Special Discovery Master.
As all parties admit, the spirit of the discovery disputes
was hostile.  At the very least, it lacked the civility and
professionalism one expects from such experienced attorneys. 
Plaintiffs filed a total of twelve motions for sanctions and/or
contempt, seeking to sanction all Defendants and all their
attorneys, as well as two non-parties and their counsel. 
Magistrate Judge Rapoport denied the five requests for sanctions
or contempt before him.   Only two of Judge Gardner’s 4
subsequent rulings on the sanctions requests are the subjects of
this appeal.
On April 26, 2004, Judge Gardner extended the original
discovery deadlines of March 1, 2004, for class discovery and
August 2, 2004, for all other discovery, to June 25, 2004, for
class discovery and January 3, 2005, for all other discovery.  In
addition, “because of the inability of the parties to resolve any of
their discovery disputes without intervention, [Judge Gardner]
placed this matter into civil suspense [on August 5, 2004,] but
required the parties to continue the discovery process.”  App. at
63.  During this period, he required discovery and document
production to continue to move forward.  For all practical
purposes, it did not, and instead the parties reached a discovery
stalemate.  Judge Gardner described the parties’ behavior during
the civil suspense period as follows: “From late 2004 into the
summer of 2005 the parties continued their incessant motion
 Inexplicably,  Judge Gardner,  in his subsequent September5
28, 2007 Sanctions Order, stated that Judge Rapoport granted
plaintiffs’ motion to strike, but he did not note that he had
previously found that at least part of that order was “clearly
erroneous and contrary to law.”   See App. at 82.
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practice and exhibited a complete inability to agree on even the
most basic matters.”   App. at 63.  On September 26, 2005,
Judge Gardner ordered the case removed from civil suspense and
set new discovery deadlines.
In the meantime, on July 26, 2005, Judge Rapoport
granted “Plaintiffs’ Combined Motion to Strike Defendants’
‘General’ and Other Objections,” App. at 804, with the
explanation that “[t]his Court notes that the parties have entered
into a Stipulated Protective Order which protects their interests.” 
App. at 804 n.1 (listing the extensive general objections to be
stricken).  Defendants petitioned Judge Gardner for
reconsideration of that order and, on November 2, 2005, Judge
Gardner granted in part and denied in part those petitions for
reconsideration.  He stated, “[W]e decline to specifically address
all of defendants’ contentions because we conclude that the
Stipulated Protective Order entered into between the parties may
be a legal basis to strike some, but is not a legal basis to strike
all, of defendants objections.  Accordingly, to that extent, we
agree with defendants that Judge Rapoport’s Order is clearly
erroneous and contrary to law.”  App. at 1123 n.1.  The Court
then ordered that the “defendants’ general objections to
plaintiffs’ interrogatories and requests for productions of
documents are referred to the Special Discovery Master.”  App.
at 1124.5
At the beginning of the civil suspense period, Plaintiffs
filed a request for the appointment of a special discovery master
to help move discovery along.  In late summer of 2004, Judge
Gardner ordered all parties to brief whether a Special Master
should be appointed to oversee discovery.  The parties did so
promptly and, on August 25, 2005, the Court entered an order
appointing Karolyn Vreeland Blume as Special Discovery
14
Master.   Under the direction of Blume, including weekly
meetings and intensive monitoring, discovery began to run more
smoothly.  On December 5, 2005, the Special Discovery Master
wrote in an email to the parties: “It was not my intent to blame
any party for the discovery delays that have occurred in this case. 
As I have stated on multiple occasions, the system has failed this
case, and we are all trying to get it back on track at the eleventh
hour.  When you look at what has been accomplished due to
everyone’s diligent efforts in the last six weeks, it is truly
amazing.”  App. at 10089.  Over the next two years, however,
she changed her view of the parties’ cooperation.  See p. 15
infra.
The parties disagree as to the cause of the improvement in
the discovery process. Appellants attribute this improvement to
Special Discovery Master Blume’s new focus on Defendants’
specific objections because, as Stradley argues, she “instructed
Plaintiffs to provide a ‘High Priority List’ of those documents
sought from Defendants that were most important to Plaintiffs’
case,” and to withdraw “220 of their pending discovery
requests,” and because the Special Discovery Master
“concluded, just as Highmark had maintained all along, that
Highmark had no obligation to produce the claims data Plaintiffs
sought.”  Stradley Br. at 18-19. That was because Highmark did
not have custody and control of the data when discovery requests
were made.
In contrast, Appellees suggest that the improvement in
document production was due to the “discovery” of “recently
located” responsive documents that Defendants had previously
denied existed or had failed to produce for more than a year. 
Appellees’ Br. at 9-10.  Appellees assert that “after the
coincidental rash of ‘recent discovery’ by all Appellants of long
sought after documents that coincided with the appointment [of]
the Special Discovery Master, Appellants, and all of them, began
to utilize a tactic of last minute, piecemeal, late production of
discovery material, all of which was designed to frustrate and
encumber the ability of the class action Plaintiffs to properly
conduct discovery and prosecute their claims.”  Appellees’ Br. at
10.  To this effect, Special Discovery Master Blume noted the
 The order was dated March 29, 2006, but filed March 30,6
which explains why some parties refer to the date of this order as
March 29, 2006.
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following on February 1, 2006: “Although document production
has been ongoing, tens of thousands of pages were produced
yesterday, the final day of [class] discovery.”  App. at 6800
(emphasis added).  Moreover, the Special Discovery Master took
the general objections “off the table,” App. 10329, requiring that
Defendants assert only specific objections, and noted that the
“general objections filed by [D]efendants were a major barrier to
discovery.” App. at 7806.
On another occasion, Judge Gardner remarked that
“[w]hile February 1, 2006 was the deadline established by the
court for the completion of class discovery in this matter, . . .
[d]ocuments offered and received into evidence at the class
certification hearings included those produced on the evening of
Friday, March 3, 2006 when defense counsel forwarded to
plaintiffs’ counsel computer disks containing thousands of pages
of information regarding claims submissions.”  App. at 65 n.16.
From March 6 to 10, 2006, Judge Gardner held a class
certification hearing, officially closing the record on March 10,
2006.  On December 20, 2006, he certified a class in this action,
certified several factual and legal issues, and approved Dr.
Grider as the sole class representative.
B.  The March 30, 2006 Order6
On July 20, 2005, shortly before the case was removed
from civil suspense, Magistrate Judge Rapoport issued an order
stating that “Defendants’ Counsel are admonished for their
violations of the Stipulated Protective Order,” for placing highly
confidential material in the public record that should have been
kept under seal.  App. at 803.  He further ordered that “all
counsel are directed to strictly adhere to the terms of the
Protective Order, and if counsel for any party fails to comply
with this Order and violates [that order], other counsel may
16
apply to the Court for imposition of appropriate sanctions.” 
App. at 803 (emphasis in original).  However, Magistrate Judge
Rapoport did not explain the basis for his order until after
Defendants petitioned Judge Gardner for reconsideration of the
order, and the latter “remanded this matter to . . . Magistrate
Judge Arnold C. Rapoport to permit him the opportunity to file a
Memorandum stating his reasons in support of his July 20, 2005
Order admonishing defendants.”  App. at 27.
Accordingly, in an order dated March 27, 2006,
Magistrate Judge Rapoport noted that Plaintiffs had moved for
an injunction against Defendants to prevent them from
continuing to file highly confidential documents in the public
record without placing them under seal.  Defendants argued that
the issue was moot because they “took prompt and appropriate
remedial action in isolated instances when inadvertent disclosure
of a protected document was made.”  App. at 1937-38.
Magistrate Judge Rapoport ruled “that Plaintiffs did not
meet the standard required for injunctive relief” and that
“sanctioning Defendants’ counsel was not an appropriate remedy
for failure to comply with the . . . Protective Order, particularly
because counsel had already remedied any failure to comply with
[that order].”  App. at 1938 (footnote omitted).  Instead, “the
appropriate remedy was simply to admonish, or caution,
Defendants’ counsel, and also to warn all counsel that the terms
of the Stipulated Protective Order should be followed.  This
Court [i.e., the Magistrate Judge] did not consider the
admonition to be a sanction.”  App. at 1938-1939 (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted).  In so concluding, Magistrate Judge
Rapoport observed that Black’s Law Dictionary defines a
“sanction” as a “‘[p]enalty or other mechanism of enforcement
used to provide incentives for obedience with the law’” and
defines “admonish” as “‘[t]o caution or advise. To counsel
against wrong practices, or to warn against danger of an
offense.’”  App. at 1938 nn.2-3 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary
1341, 48 (6th ed. 1990)).
In light of Magistrate Judge Rapoport’s explanation,
Judge Gardner then denied Defendants’ joint petition for
 A district court “may reconsider any pretrial matter . . .7
where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.”  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
 Between March 30, 2006, and the next sanctions order at8
issue, the September 28, 2007 order, the District Court entered an
order on January 19, 2007 enjoining Highmark and Capital from
settling the Grider claims as part of the multidistrict litigation
pending in the United States  District Court for the Southern
District of Florida (MDL No. 1334).  This court reversed, finding
that the District Court had abused its discretion.  See Grider v.
Keystone Health Plan Cent., Inc., 500 F.3d 322 (3d Cir. 2007).
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reconsideration, affirming Magistrate Judge Rapoport’s order on
March 30, 2006 (the “March 30, 2006 Order”).  In his
Memorandum, Judge Gardner found that Magistrate Judge
Rapoport’s ruling was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to
law,  but expressly  “disagree[d] with Judge Rapoport’s7
conclusion that an admonishment is not a sanction.”  App. at 39. 
The March 30, 2006 Order is one of the three orders appealed.8
C.  The September 28, 2007 Sanctions Order
The day before Judge Gardner ruled on two of the
sanctions motions filed by Plaintiffs in March and December
2006, Special Discovery Master Blume imposed sanctions for
violations of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(g)(3) and 37
on Capital, Keystone, and Crowel & Moring (the law firm that
took over representation of Keystone from Hangley) and its
partners Michael Martinez and Daniel Campbell.  Grider v.
Keystone Health Plan Cent., Inc., No. 2001-CV-05641, 2007
WL 2874423 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2007).  She concluded:
Respondents have violated numerous provisions of Rules
37 and 26(g) . . . by repeatedly interposing general,
boilerplate objections to plaintiffs’ document requests and
ignoring numerous Orders of the Court, including those
of Judge Gardner and Judge Rapoport and the directives
of the Master, and by repeating those objections in their
[later responses]. Defendants’ failure to comply with the
 The Court’s opinion is ambiguous on this point.  The9
“Conclusions of Law” section, which summarizes the sanctions
ordered, stated that only the Party-Appellants violated that rule.
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discovery process should not be viewed in isolation but
within the larger context of their other obstructionist
tactics which manifest a similar contempt of the discovery
obligations by these same parties.
Id. at *10.  Special Discovery Master Blume’s sanctions order is
not before this court.
The following day, by order dated September 28, 2007,
Judge Gardner issued the principal order before us (the
“September 28, 2007 Sanctions Order”).  That order followed
nine days of hearings on the sanctions motions, at which
Plaintiffs presented ten witnesses and 161 exhibits, and
Defendants and their counsel (combined) presented six witnesses
and 145 exhibits.  See App. at 55-56.  After the hearing, Judge
Gardner’s clerk requested that Plaintiffs submit certain “timeline
charts . . .[,] which, due to time constraints, plaintiffs were
unable to use during closing argument” at the sanctions hearing. 
App. at 23222.  Plaintiffs submitted the charts and underlying
documents to the court, with copies to counsel for all Appellants. 
Thereafter, the District Court allowed Plaintiffs and Defendants
to file post-hearing findings of fact.
In support of the September 28, 2007 Sanctions Order,
Judge Gardner issued a 77-page opinion, including 93 numbered
paragraphs containing findings of facts.  Grider v. Keystone
Health Plan Cent., Inc., No. 2001-CV-05641, 2007 WL 2874408
(E.D. Pa Sept. 28, 2007).  Because many of the findings of fact
are discussed in depth hereafter, we only briefly summarize
Judge Gardner’s conclusions here:
(1) All Appellants violated Rules 26(g)(2)(A) and (B) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) All Appellants violated Rule 37(c)(1).9
However, the order imposed sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1) against
all Appellants, and in the body of the opinion Judge Gardner
concluded “that all defendants . . ., together with their respective
counsel, . . . are each subject to sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(c).”
App. at 116-17.
 The Court explained that there was not a proper basis to10
impose sanctions against any of the Appellants for civil contempt
for violations of any court orders because “plaintiffs have failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendants have
violated any court Order for which relief could be granted.”  App.
at 118.  
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(3) The law firm defendants and the individual attorneys
violated 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Local Rule 83.6.1 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
However, Judge Gardner found there was not a proper
basis to impose any sanctions (1) for violations of court orders;10
(2) pursuant to other sections of Rule 37 of the Rules of Federal
Civil Procedure or; (3) pursuant to the Court’s inherent power to
sanction.
  Judge Gardner ordered Appellants to pay the Grider
plaintiffs (1) for their “reasonable attorneys’ fees” and costs
related to the two motions for sanctions, (2) “for all sums paid by
plaintiffs as fees to [the] Special Discovery Master,” and (3) for
their “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs” relating to
proceedings before the Special Discovery Master.  App. at 46. 
The Court ordered the plaintiffs to file a petition for the
attorneys’ fees and costs incurred and, in the meantime,
determined that the sanctioned parties and counsel “shall each
pay the following percentages:”
1. Keystone - 25%
2. Capital - 25%
3. John S. Summers, and “the law firm of Hangley,”
jointly and severally - 25%
4. Highmark - 10%
 The order states:11
In Kerr v. United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, 426 U.S. 394 U.S. 304
(1976), the Supreme Court instructed that the conditions for
issuing a writ of mandamus include that “the party seeking
issuance of the writ have no other adequate means to attain
the relief he desires” and that the “right to issuance of the
writ is clear and indisputable.” Id. at 403 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).  In our view, it is not clear and
indisputable from the record  before us that the petitioners
have a right to the relief requested. See Cunningham v.
Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 205-206 (1999).
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the foregoing
petitions for mandamus are DENIED.
App. at 23234.
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5. Sandra A. Girifalco, and the law firm of Stradley,
jointly and severally - 10%
6. Daniel Huyett, Jeffrey Bukowski, and the law firm of
Stevens & Lee, jointly and  severally - 5%
App. at 46-47.
Each of the sanctioned parties petitioned this court for a
writ of mandamus seeking an order requiring the District Court
to vacate the sanctions.  This court denied the petitions in a one-
paragraph order.11
On October 30, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their fee petition
seeking payment by Defendants of a fee of  $3,244,612.50 (the
“collective lodestar of [Plaintiffs] . . . (that is, each [counsel’s]
total time multiplied by his current hourly rate”)), and collective
costs of $238,361.17.  App. at 18557.  However, because the
parties settled the underlying class action before the District
Court ruled on the fee petition, the sanctions were never
quantified and reduced to monetary amounts.
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D.  Settlement of the Underlying Litigation 
Plaintiffs and Highmark entered into a settlement
agreement on February 11, 2008, which provided for Highmark
to pay stipulated amounts to the class members and attorneys’
fees of up to $3,450,000.  In return, Plaintiffs agreed to
“expressly waive, release, and disclaim any right to the monetary
component of any sanctions award that may be entered against
[Highmark] or [its] current or former attorneys in the Grider
Action.” App. at 23332.  Plaintiffs also agreed not to oppose
Highmark’s forthcoming motion “to vacate [the] Court’s
sanctions opinion and Order (dated September 28, 2007).”  App.
at 23334.
On March 12, 2008, Plaintiffs and Capital and Keystone
(by this time, a wholly owned subsidiary of Capital) entered into
a similar settlement agreement, which provided for Capital and
Keystone to pay $7 million in attorneys’ fees.  In exchange,
Plaintiffs agreed to “waive, release and forever discharge the
amount of any sanctions awarded against Capital and Keystone
and their current and former counsel by the Court.”  App. at
23549.  Plaintiffs also agreed not to oppose Capital and
Keystone’s forthcoming motion to vacate the September 28,
2007 Sanctions Order.
The District Court subsequently approved both
settlements, ordered Defendants to pay the attorneys’ fees agreed
upon in the settlement agreements, and issued orders dismissing
with prejudice all claims against Highmark, Keystone, and
Capital.
Keystone, Capital, and Highmark, joined by Hangley and
Stevens & Lee,  moved, unopposed, to vacate the September 28,
2007 Sanctions Order.  Stradley did not join those motions and
did not file a separate motion.  On June 25, 2008, Judge Gardner
denied that motion.
All of the sanctioned parties filed notices of appeal.  The
law firms Hangley, Stevens & Lee, and Stradley, appeal the
March 30, 2006 Order (Judge Gardner affirming Judge
 Although Appellees have nothing of monetary value at12
issue, their brief explains that they are participating in this appeal
“in an effort to vindicate the law of discovery and its orderly and
professional processes, and to defend a district judge with the
courage to make good and hard judgments and rulings no matter
what their popularity.”  Appellees’ Br. at 27-28.  In doing so, they
also seek to sustain Judge Gardner’s orders.
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Rapoport’s July 20, 2005 order and determining it was a
sanction, not an admonition).  All Appellants appeal the
September 28, 2007 Sanctions Order.  All Appellants, except
Stradley, appeal the June 25, 2008 order denying Capital,
Keystone, and Highmark’s motions to vacate the September 28,
2007 Sanctions Order.
II.
Jurisdiction
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.   Appellees argue that we lack jurisdiction over this12
appeal on the grounds of finality and mootness.  For the reasons
set forth here, we reject both arguments and exercise jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
A.  Finality 
Appellees contend that the orders appealed are not final
because the District Court did not quantify the dollar amount of
the sanctions.  In response, Appellants argue that the orders on
appeal became final on June 13, 2008, when the District Court
entered orders approving the underlying settlements and
dismissing all claims against all Defendants.  The Appellants
have the better argument.
“Ordinarily the proceedings in a district court must be
final as to . . . all causes of action and parties for a court of
appeals to have jurisdiction over an appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
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1291.”  Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 460 F.3d 470,
476 (3d Cir. 2006).  “The classic definition of a ‘final decision’
is one that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing
for the court to do but execute the judgment.’”  Id. (quoting
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996)
(quotation omitted)).  Moreover, “[t]he general rule is that ‘a
party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final
judgment has been entered, in which claims of district court
error at any stage of the litigation may be ventilated.’” 
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 712 (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994)); see also
Morton, 460 F.3d at 476 (“[O]nce all claims against all parties
have been dismissed a prior order will become final for purposes
of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”).
This court considered the issue of finality in the context
of an appeal of a sanction order in Napier v. Thirty or More
Unidentified Federal Agents, Employees or Officers, 855 F.2d
1080 (3d Cir. 1988), where the court had entered an order
imposing sanctions and a later order quantifying the dollar
amount of the sanctions.  We held that a final, appealable order
was the one fixing the amount of the sanctions award.  Id. at
1083; see also Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S.
198 (1999) (holding that sanctions order not final and appealable
where proceedings below were still ongoing); Lazorko v.
Pennsylvania Hosp., 237 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that
sanctions order was not final and appealable until entry of order
determining sanctions amount); In re Jeannette Corp., 832 F.2d
43 (3d Cir. 1987) (same).
The rule in Napier speaks to a different scenario than the
one presented here.  In Napier, we stated that the appeal of the
sanctions order would have been premature because it could be
brought later in the course of proceedings after entry of an order
quantifying the dollar amount of the sanctions.  This rule is in
keeping with the finality requirement, which is intended to avoid
piecemeal appeals.  In the appeal before us, the District Court
had already rendered a final order by June 13, 2008, by
dismissing all claims.  As a result, the finality concern that
undergirds Napier is simply not implicated here.
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Instead, we are guided by Perkins v. General Motors
Corp., in which a sister court of appeals held that it had
jurisdiction over the appeal of a sanctions order even though the
district court “never determined the monetary value of the
sanctions.”  965 F.2d 597, 599 (8th Cir. 1992).  In Perkins, the
district court “levied sanctions against [the plaintiff and her
attorney] for various abuses during trial and discovery.”  Id. at
598.  However, before the district court could quantify the
amount of the sanctions, “the parties settled the underlying case
[and, as] part of the settlement agreement, [the defendant] joined
[the plaintiff and her attorney] in moving the court to lift the
sanction order.”  Id.  The court declined to do so.  Id.  The
plaintiff and her attorney appealed, id. at 599, and the respondent
(the district court judge, as the Defendant did not participate in
the appeal) argued that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction
because there “ha[d] been no final appealable order,” id. & n.3.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed that
the initial sanction order was not final and appealable at the time
it was issued, but held that the subsequent order denying the
motion to lift the sanction order “made final the [earlier]
sanction order.”  Id. at 599.  The court reasoned as follows:
While the district court did not assess a monetary penalty,
[the defendant] informed the district court that it had
agreed as part of the settlement not to collect any
monetary sanctions. Therefore, it was reasonable for the
district court to issue the sanction order without monetary
penalty. The failure of the district court to go through the
motions of assessing a dollar amount to penalties [the
defendant] had agreed not to pursue does not prevent the
sanction order from becoming final. The finality
requirement should be given a “practical rather than a
technical construction.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981).
Id. at 599-600.  In addition, the court reasoned that “compelling
policy reasons” supported a holding that it had jurisdiction over
such appeals:
 We are aware of no binding authority instructing that a13
final judgment of dismissal that results from a court-approved
settlement should be treated any differently than any other final
judgment for the purpose of rendering earlier, interlocutory orders
final and appealable.
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If an attorney is unable to appeal a sanction order after the
underlying case has been settled, the attorney is left with
no avenue of challenging the sanction order. The law
encourages parties to settle disputes. An attorney must be
free to settle cases when settlement is in the client’s best
interest. The refusal to grant jurisdiction over an appeal of
sanctions after the underlying suit has been settled thrusts
a personal conflict upon the attorney-by settling a case in
the client’s interest he may have to forfeit a personal right
to appeal the sanctions levied against him.
Id. at 600; see also Ritchie v. United States, 451 F.3d 1019, 1022
(9th Cir. 2006) (Although the district court did not quantify the
sanctions order, the court of appeals had jurisdiction because the
party seeking sanctions had “expressly waived his right to
monetary sanctions . . . , leaving nothing for the district court to
decide.”).
We agree with the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in
Perkins and hold that the District Court’s order of June 13, 2008,
which dismissed all claims against all parties with prejudice,
rendered final the orders appealed here because it “‘end[ed] the
litigation on the merits and le[ft] nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment.’”   Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 712
(quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).13
B.  Mootness
Appellees also argue that the settlement of the underlying
class action mooted these appeals because “the attorney’s fees
agreed upon in [the] settlement [agreements] . . . covered any
monetary awards that might be (but never were) quantified and
awarded pursuant to the Sanction Order and Opinion.” 
 The court further noted that “[o]nly the Seventh Circuit14
has clearly held that a public reprimand not accompanied by a
monetary sanction is non-appealable.”  Bowers, 475 F.3d at 543
(citing Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., Inc., 972 F.2d 817,
820 (7th Cir. 1992)).
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Appellees’ Br. at 37.  Therefore, the settlements “and the yet to
be quantified sanctions amounts formed a complete settlement of
the case [and] . . . any issue currently before this Court involving
that sanctions decision is moot.”  Appellees’ Br. at 37 (emphasis
omitted).  Appellants respond that the settlements did not moot
the appeals because the Appellants experienced (and continue to
experience) reputational harm.
This court’s precedent supports Appellants’ position.  In
In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 229-230 (3d Cir. 2003), an attorney
appealed a suspension order imposed on him during disciplinary
proceedings.  However, the term of his suspension expired
before he appealed, suggesting that the case might be moot. 
This court disagreed, holding that the Appellant’s claim fit
within the following exception to the mootness doctrine: a court
will hear an otherwise moot appeal where “the trial court’s order
will have possible collateral consequences,” id. at 230 (internal
quotations omitted), and the relevant collateral consequence
there was “the continuing stigma resulting from his suspension,”
id.  Similarly, in Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475
F.3d 524, 542-43 (3d Cir. 2007), this court held that an attorney
had standing to appeal a non-quantified sanction order because
“a public reprimand carries with it the formal censure of the
court and may, in many cases, have more of an adverse effect
upon an attorney than a minimal monetary sanction.”  Id. at 543.
Although Bowers was about standing, rather than mootness, it
demonstrates that we have considered reputational harm to be a
cognizable injury when determining whether the appeal of a
sanctions order is justiciable.14
On a related issue, in Perkins the court rejected the
argument that “since [the defendant] ha[d] agreed not to collect
monetary sanctions, there is no longer an adversarial relationship
 Appellees also argue that we lack jurisdiction because this15
court previously rejected Appellants’ mandamus petitions with
respect to the September 28, 2007 Sanctions Order.  In denying
Appellants’ petitions, this court determined that the extraordinary
remedy of mandamus was not appropriate; it did not determine
whether the Court’s  Sanctions Order was an abuse of discretion or
violated Appellants’ due process rights - the issues now before this
court concerning that order.  See, e.g., Capital/Keystone Reply Br.
at 11.  Moreover, in deciding the mandamus petitions, this court
did not consider the other two orders now before us.  See, e.g.,
App. 14425 (Capital/Keystone Mandamus Petition).
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and the sanction order is moot.”  965 F.2d at 600.  The court
reasoned: “Appellants are entitled to bargain with adversaries to
drop a motion for sanctions, but they cannot unilaterally bargain
away the court’s discretion in imposing sanctions and the
public’s interest in ensuring compliance with the rules of
procedure.”   Id.  We are aware of no binding precedent that
contradicts these cases or otherwise requires a holding that this
case is moot.
Accordingly, we conclude that the doctrines of finality
and mootness do not deprive this court of jurisdiction over this
appeal.15
III.
Standard of Review
“The decision to impose sanctions for discovery
violations and any determination as to what sanctions are
appropriate are matters generally entrusted to the discretion of
the district court,” and “therefore [this court] review[s] a district
court’s decision to impose . . . sanctions for abuse of discretion.” 
Bowers, 475 F.3d at 538.  “While this standard of review is
deferential, a district court abuses its discretion in imposing
sanctions when it ‘base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the
law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.’”  Id.
(quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405
 None of the parties defines “general objections,” but the16
Philadelphia Bar Association, which filed an amicus brief in
support of Appellants,  provided the following explanation:
“General objections,” as that term is commonly understood
and used herein, refers to objections that a party responding
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(1990)).
IV.
Discussion
A.  The September 28, 2007 Sanctions Order
1.  Factual Challenges
In Judge Gardner’s opinion supporting his September 28,
2007 Sanctions Order, he concluded that the corporate
Defendants and their counsel (i.e., all of the Appellants)
“engaged in a course of conduct which makes it clear that they
have not been forthcoming with the most important information
in this case,” App. at 91, by (1) “interpos[ing] . . . legally
deficient general objections for the improper purpose of delaying
discovery in this case and to increase the costs to plaintiffs of
bringing this case to trial,”  App. at 97, (2) failing to make a
good faith effort to locate and produce documents requested by
Plaintiffs, see App. at 100-02, (3) failing timely to produce and
supplement discovery, see App. at 109-116, and (4) “act[ing] in
bad faith in order to multiply these proceedings,” App. at 125. 
Appellants challenge the factual bases of these conclusions as
clearly erroneous.
a.  Factual Findings
Judge Gardner’s lengthy and detailed set of factual
findings served as the foundation for imposing sanctions.  He
found that “counsel for all defendants refused to withdraw the
‘general objections’  contained in all of their respective16
to discovery asserts as applicable to multiple individual
requests set forth in, for example, a given set of
interrogatories or document production requests. “General
objections” sometimes appear in response to equally
“general” features of the discovery requests themselves,
such as general or blanket instructions as to the time period
applicable to all requests, the way in which terms are
defined for purposes of all requests, etc. A party might
make a “general objection,” for example, to producing
electronically stored information that is “not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”  See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(A).
Amicus Br. at 4 n.2.
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responses to plaintiffs’ discovery requests.”  App. at 82.  Later in
the opinion, Judge Gardner also found that when claiming
privilege as a general objection, “no defendant included a
privilege log with their responses . . . until directed to do so by
the court.”  App. at 98.  In addition, he found that all
Defendants, through their counsel, denied the existence of
documents that Plaintiffs had sought throughout discovery, but
later announced that they had found many of those documents at,
or soon after, the first meeting with Special Discovery Master
Blume on October 20, 2005.  Specifically, Judge Gardner found
that: Girifalco, on behalf of Highmark, “announced that she had
‘recently located’ audit and other documents which counsel had
repeatedly denied existed,” App. at 83; Hangley, on behalf of
Keystone, “also announced that Keystone had also ‘recently
located’ 24 boxes of material responsive to plaintiffs’ discovery
requests,” App. at 83; and Stevens & Lee, on behalf of Capital,
“announced the ‘discovery’ of up to 60 boxes of recently located
audit workpapers that counsel had previously denied existed, and
which documents were represented to the [Special Discovery
Master] one week earlier as having been destroyed,”  App. at 83.
Similarly, Judge Gardner found that Keystone - despite its
persistent claims to the contrary - had the ability to obtain and/or
generate claims data through its internal Comprehensive
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Analytical Health Reporting System (“CAHRS”) “in the routine
course of business,” App. at 77, or to retrieve such data from
Synertech through their Administrative Services Agreement
(“ASA”), which entitled Keystone “to obtain routine and regular
reports from Synertech created from the data that Synertech
stored,” App. at 76.  Moreover, Judge Gardner pointed out that,
in December 2005, “Keystone produced 50,937 documents
including Synertech Systems Request Forms which had been
previously withheld from plaintiffs . . . [in] boxes of documents
labeled ‘Withheld Synertech Documents.’”  App. at 84.
Judge Gardner also noted numerous instances of other last
minute or late document production, including the following: (1)
“[l]ate in the evening after normal business hours the night prior
to [depositions related to claims data], counsel for Keystone
forwarded hundreds of documents which previously had been
requested by plaintiffs, App. at 84; (2) “[t]ens of thousands of
documents were produced by defendants collectively . . . the day
before the end of class discovery,” App. at 85; (3) on “the last
day of class discovery, Capital produced [certain] documents
after repeatedly denying that it had any such documents,” App.
at 85; and (4) after the deadline for class discovery production
had passed, Highmark “produced 4,356 pages of documents,”
some of which had been “previously produced by Highmark to
defendants’ joint expert,” and “included [certain documents], of
which Highmark and its counsel previously had denied
possession,” App. at 85.
In addition, Judge Gardner found that Summers refused to
produce underlying materials that supported his “Declarations
which affirmatively represented to the court that [certain of]
plaintiffs’ allegations . . . lacked any factual basis . . . [and] were
‘without merit,’” App. at 78, claiming that the documents were,
alternately, “lay opinion,” App. at 79, that they consisted of
“expert disclosure,” App. at 79, and later that they “were
protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine,” App. at 80, but nontheless “refused to list the
declarant materials on a privilege log,” App. at 82.  Judge
Gardner also concluded that Highmark and Girifalco falsely
represented that Highmark had searched for (and not found)
 A number of the Appellants argue that these factual17
findings were not the product of Judge Gardner’s independent
judgment because his findings very closely resembled Plaintiffs’
Proposed Findings of Fact and that, therefore, the District Court’s
reliance on Plaintiffs’ version of events constituted a due process
violation.  See, e.g., Hangley Br. at 41.  We reject this argument
because, as the Supreme Court has held, “even when the trial judge
adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the
court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous.”  Anderson v.
City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572 (1985).
 We cannot sustain Judge Gardner’s finding that the18
general objections were dismissed or stricken. In fact, although
Magistrate Judge Rapoport dismissed the general objections, Judge
Gardner vacated that decision.  See App. at 1123 n.1.  The Special
Discovery Master took the general objection “off the table” in
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audit documents.  Judge Gardner based this conclusion on the
fact that Girifalco had certified in written discovery responses in
2004 that “a reasonable investigation was completed and that
Highmark was not in possession of any audit documents,” but in
a November 2005 letter “stated that Highmark had not even
looked for any documents which were subject to an objection.” 
App. at 101.
Appellants challenge many of Judge Gardner’s factual
findings as clearly erroneous, contending that there was no
factual basis in the record for the imposition of sanctions.  See,
e.g., Tr. of Oral Argument at 6-7, Grider v. Keystone Health
Plan Cent., Inc., Nos. 08-3073, 08-3074, 08-3075, 08-3076, 08-
3077 (3d Cir. July 9, 2009) (counsel for Hangley, arguing on
behalf of all Appellants, stated, “It is my position . . . that on this
record there is not a basis for sanctions” and “there is not a
foundation in the record for the judge’s findings”).  We disagree. 
Having examined the voluminous record in this case and
compared it to the sanctions opinion, we conclude that Judge
Gardner’s factual findings have support in the record and are,
therefore, not clearly erroneous.  We will not disturb any of
Judge Gardner’s factual findings,  with one immaterial17
exception.18
order to focus on the specific objections, but as Anthony J.
Bocchino, arguing on behalf of Appellees, conceded at oral
argument: “the parties agreed to proceed as if they did not exist.”
Tr. of Oral Argument at 70. Nonetheless, we deem this erroneous
finding to be immaterial because Judge Gardner’s conclusion that
Appellants misused general objections was not dependant on his
finding that they had been dismissed.
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b.  Credibility Determinations
Judge Gardner based the conclusions he drew from these
factual findings, in part, on adverse credibility determinations. 
Having observed the parties and their attorneys in the course of
proceedings for almost six years and having observed the
attorneys as witnesses during the nine-day sanctions hearing,
Judge Gardner stated at the beginning of his sanctions order:
“Initially, I do not believe the testimony of Attorneys Summers,
Girifalco, Huyett and Bukowski that they did nothing to frustrate
discovery in this case.  Rather, I conclude that there was a
concerted effort to frustrate plaintiffs’ attempts at obtaining
relevant discovery.”  App. at 97.  Elsewhere in the opinion,
Judge Gardner added:
[R]egarding the credibility of Attorneys Girifalco and
Summers, I found both to be evasive in their responses to
many of the questions posed at the sanctions hearings by
plaintiff’s counsel.  However, the demeanor and body
language of both witnesses changed dramatically when
questioned by their own counsel.  Although, . . . it is not
unusual for a witnesses’ [sic] demeanor to change when
subject to adverse questioning, the degree to which these
witnesses’ demeanor changed was so striking that it left
me with the feeling that they both were hiding significant
information and were not completely candid about their
activities in this matter.
App. at 92-93.  In addition, Judge Gardner reiterated that counsel
for Highmark and Keystone “announced [at the first meeting
with Special Discovery Master Blume] that they had just recently
 All Appellants except Keystone and Capital challenge19
Judge Gardner’s credibility determinations.
 Cooter & Gell cited with approval the Rule 52(a) standard20
of review for a district court’s findings in a case involving Rule 11
sanctions, a context that is analogous to the instant case.
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located responsive documents to long-sought-after discovery,” 
App. at 97, and that later “Huyett announced that Capital had
also just located up to 60 boxes of material,”  App. at 97.
 With respect to all Appellants, Judge Gardner continued:
Defense counsel all testified that they attempted to work
with plaintiffs. However, this assertion is belied by an
apparent lack of discovery that was produced for the
nearly one year that this case was in civil suspense from
August 5, 2004 until the first meeting with Special
Discovery Master Blume on October 20, 2005. (As noted
above, the Order placing this case in civil suspense
clearly directed the parties to continue discovery while the
case was in suspense.)
App. at 97.
Nearly all Appellants challenge Judge Gardner’s
credibility determinations.   We review credibility19
determinations, like other factual findings, under a clearly
erroneous standard.  See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 400
(“‘Findings of fact . . . shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses’”
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1985))).   Appellants argue that20
Judge Gardner did not have a sufficient factual basis for finding
that the attorneys lacked credibility.  See, e.g., Stevens & Lee Br.
at 50.
We disagree.  Judge Gardner invested the time and effort
to hold a lengthy hearing and closely observe the witnesses.  He
was entitled to find that the attorneys’ testimony was not
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credible, “for only the trial judge can be aware of the variations
in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the
listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said.” 
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575 (citation omitted).  In addition, Judge
Gardner was in the best position to determine whether the
attorneys’ testimony at the sanctions hearing was credible in
light of their actions in the almost six years of proceedings
before him.  We conclude that Judge Gardner’s credibility
determinations were within his province as the finder of fact and
were not clearly erroneous.
Appellants also challenge the weight that Judge Gardner
gave these credibility determinations, arguing that credibility
determinations supplanted affirmative evidence of wrongdoing. 
Appellants are correct that “discredited testimony is not
considered a sufficient basis for drawing a contrary conclusion.” 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 512 (1984) (citation omitted); see also Eckenrode v. Pa.
R.R. Co., 164 F.2d 996, 999 n.8 (3d Cir. 1947) (“[A] belief that
testimony is false will not support an affirmative finding that the
reverse of that testimony is true.”).  Similarly, as Highmark
observes, “a court may not ‘insulate [its] findings from review
by denominating them credibility determinations.’”  Highmark
Br. at 39 (alteration added) (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575).
Highmark argues that the “district court’s ‘findings’
violate these principles” because “[t]here is no direct evidence
supporting . . . a finding that Highmark ‘hid’ documents behind
its general objections . . . .  Similarly, the fact that Highmark
produced documents after the SDM was appointed does not
establish that Highmark had been ‘hiding’ documents before that
time.”  Highmark Br. at 40.  “Nothing about this sequence of
events even suggests, much less establishes, that Highmark had
been hiding behind its general objections . . . .”  Highmark Br. at
40-41 (citing App. at 692, 10403, 10404).  Stradley, Stevens &
Lee, and Hangley echo this same argument.  See Stradley Br. at
44-47; Stevens & Lee Br. at 50; Hangley Br. at 46-48.
We reject Appellants’ arguments that Judge Gardner used
his adverse credibility determinations to compensate for an
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absence of affirmative evidence or to insulate his factual
findings from review by this court.  Judge Gardner’s conclusion
that the attorneys impeded discovery was not based solely on his
determination that their testimony to the contrary was incredible. 
Instead, years of observing the conduct of the Defendants and
their counsel supplied Judge Gardner with ample affirmative
evidence from which he could infer that Appellants “engaged in
a course of conduct which makes it clear that they have not been
forthcoming with the most important information in this case.” 
App. at 91.  For instance, having compared the pace and volume
of Defendants’ production before and after the appointment of
Special Discovery Master Blume, Judge Gardner was entitled to
draw the inference that the later rash of “discovery” of “recently-
located” documents was not coincidence and that, instead,
Appellants had been withholding documents behind their general
objections.  This was a permissible inference in light of the
sequence of events.  See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574 (“Where
there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”).  Moreover,
such a conclusion would be permissible even if Judge Gardner
had not found incredible the attorneys’ testimony that they did
nothing to frustrate discovery.  Judge Gardner was entitled to
credit his own first-hand observations of the Appellants’ conduct
over the attorneys’ self-serving testimony about this same
conduct.  Again, Judge Gardner’s factual conclusions were
within his province as the finder of fact and warrant our
deference under the highly deferential standard of review.  Given
our scope of review, we cannot disturb the trial court’s adverse
credibility findings.
2.  Legal Challenges
Although we do not disturb Judge Gardner’s factual
findings, we will vacate the September 28, 2007 Sanctions Order
because there are several significant legal errors.  See Cooter &
Gell, 496 U.S. at 402 (“‘If [the Court of Appeals] believed that
the District Court’s factual findings were unassailable, but that
the proper rule of law was misapplied to those findings, it could
have reversed the District Court’s judgment.”’ (alteration in
original) (quoting Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S.
 Rule 26(g) was amended, without change to its substance,21
effective Dec. 1, 2007.
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709, 714 (1986))).
a.  Rule 26(g)
Judge Gardner sanctioned all Appellants under the
following version of Rule 26(g),  which provided, as relevant21
here:
(2) Every . . . objection made by a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record
in the attorney’s individual name . . . . The signature of
the attorney . . . constitutes a certification that to the best
of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after a reasonable inquiry, the request, response,
or objection is:
(A) consistent with these rules and warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
(B) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation; and . . . 
(3) If without substantial justification a certification is
made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
made the certification, the party on whose behalf the . . .
objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which
may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the violation, including a
reasonable attorney’s fee.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2)(3) (2000) (emphasis added).  Judge
Gardner held that all Appellants violated these rules by
interposing general objections and by failing to make a good
faith effort to locate certain documents.  We are compelled to
reverse the imposition of sanctions under Rule 26(g) because
Judge Gardner failed to analyze the “substantial justification”
standard expressly articulated in the Rule.
 Although we agree with Amicus that a rule requiring22
creation of an ongoing log of all post-complaint privileged
communications would have a chilling effect on the attorney-client
relationship, we do not read the District Court’s opinion as stating
such a rule.  We underscore that a privilege log may not be required
for communications with counsel that take place after the filing of
a law suit.  See James W. Quinn, Mindy J. Spector & John P.
Mastando III, Responding to Document Requests, 2 Bus. & Com.
Litig. Fed. Cts. § 21:41 (Robert L. Haig, ed., 2d ed. 2006) (“[I]n
most litigations, counsel will agree to omit from the privilege log
documents created by outside or in-house counsel after the
litigation has commenced.”)
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Rule 26(g) provides that an attorney will be sanctioned
for noncompliance with that rule “[i]f without substantial
justification a certification is made in violation of the rule.”  Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3) (emphasis added) (2000).  There is nothing in
Judge Gardner’s opinion that discusses or expressly considers
the contours of this standard or explains the ways in which
Appellants’ legal positions were not substantially justified.  This
standard is entirely absent in the opinion.
For instance, Judge Gardner found improper Keystone’s
general objection “to the production of a privilege log regarding
documents prepared or created after [its] current counsel were
retained.”  App. at 98.  However, Judge Gardner never explained
the legal basis for his conclusion that such an objection was
improper.   Likewise, the opinion noted “[o]ther examples of22
improper general objections,” citing discovery responses from
all three corporate Defendants.  The legitimacy of a general
objection turns on the objection and its context.  The Federal
Rules do not prohibit general objections, but if the general
objection is interposed in an attempt to insulate from discovery a
large quantity of material that includes otherwise discoverable
material when only some of the material may be protectible, the
objection is inconsistent with the aim of discovery and may well
be the subject of sanction.  See generally 7 James Wm. Moore et
al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 33.171 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). 
The opinion accompanying the September 28 Order did not
 This court has not addressed  the “substantial23
justification” standard, but we note that in  Tolerico v. Home
Depot, Chief Judge Vanaskie, of the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, stated:
“Substantial justification” for the failure to make a required
disclosure has been regarded as justification to a degree that
could satisfy a reasonable person that parties could differ as
to whether the party was required to comply with the
disclosure request. The test of substantial justification is
satisfied if there exists a genuine dispute concerning
compliance.
205 F.R.D. 169, 175-76 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (internal citation and
quotations omitted); see also 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 26.154
[2][a] (“An objective standard is applied in determining whether
sanctions are to be applied under Rule 26(g). . . . [T]he issue is
whether the attorney or party who signed the certification
conducted a reasonable inquiry into the facts supporting the
disclosure or discovery document.”).
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explain why the general objections in this case were improper. 
Nor did the Court explain why these general objections were not
“substantially justified,” an explanation required by the language
of the Rule.
We offer no opinion as to whether the “substantial
justification” standard was met in this case.   It may be that if23
the Court had applied the “substantial justification” standard, it
would still have concluded that sanctions were appropriate. 
However, on this record, it is also entirely possible that it could
have found that some of Appellants’ positions were indeed
substantially justified.
For instance, Hangley argues that Keystone’s position
was substantially justified on the claims data issue because it
“objected on the basis of ‘possession custody or control’ as to
Synertech data.”  Hangley Br. at 58.  It contends that, under its
agreement with Synertech, Keystone had a right to the raw data
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held by Synertech, but not the data reports that Plaintiffs actually
sought.  Hangley Br. at 57-58.  The language of the agreement
could be read to support either position.  Hangley notes that the
agreement states that “all information generated under and/or
contained in the [system] pertaining to Keystone Central shall
also be and remain property of Keystone,” App. at 9416, but the
agreement also “confers [upon Keystone] no incidents of
ownership, interest in title or any other proprietary interest
whatsoever in the system or any parts thereof, including, without
limitation, any product, work product or otherwise resulting
from this Agreement,” App. at 9416 (emphasis added). 
Keystone also might have been substantially justified in taking
the position that, for the purposes of discovery, it did not have an
obligation to generate data compilations that were not already in
existence.  We offer no opinion as to whether Hangley or
Keystone would have prevailed with these arguments, but note
them to underscore the significance of applying the “substantial
justification” standard before imposing Rule 26(g) sanctions.
The failure to apply the applicable legal standard was
reversible error and the sanctions under Rule 26(g) cannot be
sustained.
b.  Rule 37(c)(1)
Judge Gardner also sanctioned all Appellants under Rule
37(c)(1), which provides:
A party that without substantial justification fails to
disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1),
or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by
Rule 26(e)(2), is not . . . permitted to use as evidence . . .
any witness or information not so disclosed.  In addition
to or in lieu of this sanction, the court, on motion and
after affording an opportunity to be heard, may impose
other appropriate sanctions [such as] . . . requiring
payment of reasonable expenses, including attorney’s
fees.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (2000).
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As a preliminary matter, it is unclear from the opinion
whether the District Court intended to sanction both the parties
and their counsel under Rule 37(c)(1).  As noted, supra note 9, at
one point in the opinion Judge Gardner listed only the
Defendants as sanctioned under this rule, but elsewhere he also
included their attorneys.  To the extent that the Order sanctioned
the attorneys and law firms under Rule 37(c)(1), it was legal
error.
Although we have not before had occasion to address the
applicable scope of Rule 37(e)(1) sanctions, the Second and
Seventh Circuits have expressly declined to sanction attorneys
under this rule.  In Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of N.Y., Inc., 855
F.2d 1009, 1014 (2d Cir. 1988), the court stated that, “[b]y its
express terms, Rule 37(c) applies only to a party.”  In addition,
the Apex court continued, “we must infer from the other
subsections of Rule 37 expressly providing for the imposition of
sanctions against a party’s attorney that the drafters intended to
omit attorneys from the coverage of subsection (c).”  Id.  In
reaching the same conclusion in Maynard v. Nygren, 332 F.3d
462 (7th Cir. 2003), the Seventh Circuit noted that the
“Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c) advisory committee’s note to the 1970
amendment [to Rule 37(c)] requires ‘that the party improperly
refusing the admission pay the expenses of the other side in
making the necessary proof at trial.’”  Id. at 470 (emphasis
added).  Moreover, the Wright & Miller treatise, citing Apex,
also states that Rule 37 does not permit sanctions against the
party’s attorney and includes no authority to the contrary.  8A
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 2990.  We find the reasoning of the Second and
Seventh Circuits persuasive and hold that Rule 37(c)(1) does not
permit sanctions against counsel.  Accordingly, we will vacate
all Rule 37(c)(1) sanctions against the Attorney Appellants.
As for the sanctions under 37(c)(1) imposed against the
parties here, we conclude that the sanctions cannot stand for the
same reasons that we discussed with respect to the sanctions
under Rule 26(g).  Rule 37(c)(1) is similar to Rule 26(g) in that it
expressly includes the “substantial justification” standard; a
district court may impose sanctions where “[a] party that without
 In addition, Judge Gardner erred as a matter of law insofar24
as he concluded that Capital was responsible for Keystone’s
production after Spring 2004 when it bought out Highmark.  See
App. at 116.  We are aware of no authority for the proposition that
a parent corporation, simply by virtue of ownership, may be held
responsible for its subsidiary’s alleged discovery violations.
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substantial justification fails to disclose information required
by” certain enumerated subsections of Rule 26. Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(c)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).  Because Judge Gardner did
not discuss or analyze the “substantial justification” standard in
imposing sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1), we will vacate all
sanctions under this rule against the corporate Appellants.24
c.  28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Local Rule 83.6.1
The other basis for the September 28 Sanctions Order as
to the attorney Appellants was that they violated 28 U.S.C. §
1927 and Rule 83.6.1 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.  28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in
any court of the United States or any Territory thereof
who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the
court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and
attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.
We have held that “sanctions may not be imposed under §
1927 absent a finding that counsel’s conduct resulted from bad
faith, rather than misunderstanding, bad judgment, or
well-intentioned zeal.”  LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. First Connecticut
Holding Group, L.L.C. XXIII, 287 F.3d 279, 289 (3d Cir. 2002)
(citations omitted).  As such, “under § 1927, an attorney’s
‘conduct must be of an egregious nature, stamped by bad faith
that is violative of recognized standards in the conduct of
litigation.’”  Id. (quoting Baker Indus. Inc. v. Cerberus, Ltd., 764
42
F.2d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 1985)).
Local Rule 83.6.1, “Expedition of Court Business,”
provides, in relevant part:
(b) No attorney shall, without just cause, . . .  present to
the court vexatious motions or vexatious opposition to
motions or shall fail to prepare for presentation to the
court, or shall otherwise so multiply the proceedings in a
case as to increase unreasonably and vexatiously the costs
thereof.
(c) Any attorney who fails to comply with . . . (b) may be
disciplined as the court shall deem just.
In imposing sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and
Local Rule 83.6.1, Judge Gardner incorporated certain of his
factual findings.  See App. at 123 (“I have extensively outlined
[Summers’] conduct on this case above and incorporate it
here.”); see also App. at 125 (“I adopt all the findings and
conclusions about [Girifalco’s] specific conduct discussed above
in this Opinion.”)  In addition, Judge Gardner made specific
findings that each attorney acted in bad faith.  He stated that
Summers “engaged in a course of conduct which constituted bad
faith in this matter,” App. at 123, and Girifalco, “[w]hile her
conduct was not as egregious as that of Attorney Summers, . . .
did her fair share of impeding discovery . . . and acted in bad
faith in order to multiply these proceedings.”  App. at 125. 
Although Judge Gardner noted that Huyett and Bukowsi were
“the least culpable of the defense counsel in this case, they still
helped to multiply these proceedings by their insistence on
maintaining their general objections, their initial failure to
provide privilege logs required by the Rules, and by delaying this
case and not actively moving discovery along during the period
of civil suspense.”  App. at 125.
Apparently with respect to all the attorneys (because no
particular attorney was specified), Judge Gardner provided
additional bases for his finding of bad faith.  First, he noted that
the “numerous motions filed in this matter [requesting
reconsideration of Judge Rapoport’s orders] and the conduct of
 As an example, Judge Gardner explained that the25
Defendants altered their arguments with respect to whether the
Florida MDL proceeding was relevant to their case depending on
their needs at various points in the litigation.
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counsel in their arguments to the court provide significant
evidence of their bad faith.”  App. at 126.  Second, he noted that
“defendants have either appealed or disregarded almost every
directive and recommendation issued by” the Special Discovery
Master.  App. at 126.  Third, Judge Gardner stated that
“[c]ounsel have all feigned misunderstanding of terms such as
‘disengagement,’ ‘downcoding’ and ‘bundling.’” App. at 126. 
Fourth, Judge Gardner noted that “there are numerous instances .
. . where defendants, through their counsel, took inconsistent
positions on matters in this litigation to suit their tactical
purposes at the moment.”  App. at 126.25
Considering the opinion as a whole, there were sufficient
findings of fact upon which Judge Gardner could have
concluded that Summers, Girifalco, Huyett and Bukowski acted
in bad faith in multiplying the proceedings in violation of 28
U.S.C. § 1927 and Local Rule 83.6.1.  However, in the section
of the opinion in which Judge Gardner actually discussed the
imposition of sanctions on these grounds, he did so with such
little specificity that we cannot affirm.
On the issue of the lack of specificity, Stradley argues that
Judge Gardner “painted Defendants and their attorneys and law
firms with a broad brush, indiscriminately lumping them
together in a manner that rendered it impossible to determine
who was responsible for what.”  Stradley Br. at 53.  With respect
to imposition of sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Local
Rule 83.6.1 for multiplying the proceedings, Stradley accurately
points out (1) that it appealed only two of Magistrate Rapoport’s
rulings; (2) that it only appealed five of the Special Discovery
Master’s rulings; and (3) that Judge Gardner provided no
evidence that Stradley “feigned misunderstanding of any the
terms such as ‘disengagement,’ ‘downcoding’ and ‘bundling.’”
App. at 126.
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Similarly, Stevens & Lee denies engaging in “incessant
motion practice,” pointing out that it sought reconsideration of
only two of Judge Rapoport’s rulings (and noting that it
prevailed on eleven of the fifteen discovery motions before the
Magistrate Judge).  Stevens & Lee notes that Judge Gardner
“failed to identify any single motion or appeal filed by any
defendant that did not comply with the rules, was filed in bad
faith, or lacked merit.”  Stevens & Lee Br. at 26 (emphasis in
original).  Stevens & Lee argues that good faith filing of motions
is not sanctionable and that, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), it had
the right to appeal Judge Rapoport’s decisions to Judge Gardner.
Likewise, Highmark states: “One of the most troubling
aspects of the court’s opinion in support of the sanctions order is
the degree and extent to which it paints with a broad brush,
indiscriminately referring to ‘defendants,’ rather than to any
specific defendant.  The opinion groups the Defendants together,
thereby obscuring who supposedly was responsible for what
alleged misconduct.”  Highmark Br. at 30; see also Stradley Br.
at 53 (listing findings from Judge Gardner’s opinion that refers
to “defendants” without specifying responsibility for individual
conduct).
In Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252 (3d Cir. 1995), we
considered a sanction order that provided, “Penalties will now be
imposed for the continued shenanigans of the parties and their
counsel, who have been repeatedly warned that the court would
take such action.”  Id. at 1264 n.17.  On appeal, we held that the
breadth of the sanctions order violated due process: “This
scatter-gun approach is unfair to Bender. It also makes our task
of deciding whether the district court acted consistently with a
sound exercise of discretion impossible on the record now before
us.”  Id. at 1264.  We stated that if the district court wished to
pursue sanctions against Bender, “[i]t should relate each sanction
to some aspect of Bender’s conduct and explain how that
conduct comes within the authority it relies on to impose it.  Any
sanctions imposed against Bender should also be imposed solely
because of her own improper conduct without considering the
conduct of the parties or any other attorney.”  Id. at 1265.
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The sanctions here were imposed with greater specificity
than those before us in Martin and we do not find a due process
violation here as we did there.  Nonetheless, we cannot affirm
the order because of the vague use of the terms “defendants”
without describing individual sanctionable conduct and the
general lack of factual specificity that marks the section of the
opinion discussing sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Local
Rule 83.6.1.
Unfortunately, this lack of specificity is a pervasive
characteristic of Judge Gardner’s opinion.  For example, in
allocating the percentage of responsibility of each Appellant,
Judge Gardner held Stevens & Lee responsible for paying 5% of
Plaintiffs’ costs incurred in filing the sanctions motion and
participating in proceedings before Special Discovery Master
Blume, as well as all fees Plaintiffs paid to Blume.  However,
Stevens & Lee ceased representing Capital in October 2006, well
before many of those costs and fees were incurred.  Because the
monetary aspect of the sanctions is not an issue before us, we
need not determine whether that percentage was reasonable. 
However, we note that the sanctions for Stevens & Lee should
have been cabined to the time-frame in which it represented
Capital.
The mere fact that Defendants had entered into a joint-
defense agreement did not support imputation of the actions of
one party’s attorney to another party or its attorney.  Although
the court may have permissibly concluded that the Defendants
engaged in a concerted effort to impede discovery, in
specifically outlining the bases for each legal ground for
sanctions the Court was required to describe the sanctionable
conduct of each with such specificity as to ensure that one
Defendant was not sanctioned for the acts of another.  On
occasion, the Court delineated sanctionable behavior with
appropriate specificity and individualization.  For example, in
the findings of fact section of the opinion, Judge Gardner found
that, under the ASA, Keystone could obtain claims data from
Synertech in the regular course of business, but that Keystone
“routinely denied not only the existence of the Synertech data,
but also their ability to comply with plaintiffs’ discovery
 Because we have concluded that all sanctions will be26
vacated, we need not reach Appellants’ due process arguments.
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requests.”  App. at 76.  In addition, Judge Gardner found that
claims data was “available to Keystone and in its possession and
control” as early as fall 2003 and that Keystone also had the
ability to generate claims data through its internal CAHRS
system.  App. at 77.  Later, in the discussion section, Judge
Gardner imposed sanctions under 26(g) for this conduct,
describing it again with specificity.  Nevertheless, as noted
above, sanctions on this ground must still be vacated because
Judge Gardner failed to consider whether Keystone was
substantially justified in taking the positions that it did.
As stated above, the imposition of sanctions requires an
individualized analysis that was not consistently employed here -
and certainly was not employed with respect to sanctions under
28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Local Rule 83.6.1.  It is evident from the
record that Judge Gardner was frustrated with Appellants’
conduct and, having reviewed the record, we believe that this
frustration was warranted.  We also acknowledge that this was a
situation in which it was sometimes difficult to pin-point
individual instances of sanctionable behavior (though we
recognize that this was partly because the Judge viewed the
Defendants’ overall course of conduct).  Although Judge
Gardner did not abuse his discretion in determining that
sanctions were warranted against all counsel under 28 U.S.C.
1927 and Local Rule 83.6.1, it was an abuse of discretion to
impose sanctions pursuant to those rules without undertaking an
individualized analysis.  Where attorneys’ reputations (and,
therefore, their livelihood and ability to practice their chosen
profession) are at stake, we require a judge to analyze the
sanctionable conduct with greater specificity than Judge Gardner
did in this case in imposing sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
and Local Rule 83.6.1.
In sum, although we do not displace Judge Gardner’s
findings of fact, we will vacate all sanctions against all
Appellants.   Ordinarily, we would remand the case to the26
 A district court may modify or set aside a magistrate27
judge’s pretrial order if it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
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District Court to allow it to apply the “substantial justification”
standard to sanctions under Rules 26(g) and 37(c)(1) and to
undertake a more specific and individualized analysis under 28
U.S.C. § 1927 and Local Rule 83.6.1.  However, in this
situation, where the parties have settled the matter of the
attorneys’ fees, there is no reason to remand.  It is time the
tumult in the legal community caused by this case came to an
end.
B.  The March 30, 2006 Order on Judge
Rapoport’s Admonishment
The other sanctions order that generated substantial
concern is Judge Gardner’s March 30, 2006 order which is
challenged by Hangley, Stradley, and Stevens & Lee.  In that
order, Judge Gardner affirmed the order of Magistrate Judge
Rapoport dated July 20, 2005, holding that Judge Rapoport’s
“admonishment” of counsel was “neither clearly erroneous nor
contrary to law.”  App. at 41.  Notwithstanding that Magistrate
Judge Rapoport expressly stated that he “did not consider the
admonition to be a sanction,” App. at 1939, Judge Gardner
“conclude[d] that [the admonishment] was a sanction.”  App. at
41.27
It is unusual, if not inappropriate as we note hereafter, for
one judge to recharacterize the action of another judge.  Judge
Gardner’s conclusion was based primarily on Langer v. Monarch
Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 786, 811 (3d Cir. 1992).  In Langer,
defendant Presbyterian Medical Center had filed procedurally
improper cross-claims, failed to withdraw them and caused
default judgment to be entered without notice to opposing
counsel.  Id. at 810.  The district court determined that this
“conduct ‘prima facie’ called for Rule 11 sanctions,” and
criticized that party for “‘questionable’ conduct[, but] . . .
declined to order sanctions.”  Id. at 793.  The opposing party had
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requested sanctions in the form of attorneys’ fees, but the district
court concluded that “[b]ecause [the opposing party’s] expenses
were not ‘reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing,’ it
is not entitled to attorney fees under Rule 11.”  Id. at 809.
On appeal from the district court’s failure to impose a
sanction, this court held that the “district court found a Rule 11
violation, but thought that the sanction that [the opposing party]
requested was inappropriate, and satisfied itself with a
reprimand.”  Id.  We noted, “While the record is not entirely
clear on this point, we believe that the district court did sanction
Presbyterian’s counsel with a reprimand for its unprofessional
conduct.  Reprimands are an appropriate sanction in some
cases.”  Id. at 811.  We discussed the types of sanctions that
might be appropriate for a Rule 11 violation, stating that
“‘[w]hat is “appropriate” may be a warm friendly discussion on
the record, a hard-nosed reprimand in open court, compulsory
legal education, monetary sanctions, or other measures
appropriate to the circumstances.’”  Id.(quoting Thomas v.
Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
banc)).  Based on this language, Judge Gardner concluded, “[i]f
a ‘warm friendly discussion on the record’ could constitute a
possible sanction, then an admonishment . . . would certainly
constitute a sanction.”  App. at 40.  
Stradley argues persuasively that Judge Gardner’s
determination was based on a misreading of Langer.  Its brief
states, “Langer holds that, if sanctions are warranted, then a
reprimand can constitute such a sanction.  Langer does not hold,
however, that the converse is also true - namely, that if a party is
reprimanded, then that party has been sanctioned.”  Stradley Br.
at 60 (emphasis in original).  We agree.
The situation in Langer differed significantly from that
before us.  At the time of that case, the imposition of sanctions
was mandatory once the judge determined that a Rule 11
 Effective December 1, 1993, after we decided Langer,28
Rule 11 was amended such that “the imposition of sanctions for a
Rule 11 violation is discretionary rather than mandatory.”  Knipe
v. Skinner, 19 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1994).
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violation had occurred.  Id. at 810.   This court stated (possibly28
because a sanction for violation of Rule 11 was mandatory) that
“[a]lthough the district court’s opinion nominally ‘decline[d] to
order sanctions in this case,’ . . . the district court's opinion
merely denied Monarch’s request for a particular type of
sanction.”  Id. at 811 n.29 (alterations added).
On this basis, we agree with Stradley that Langer does not
hold that an admonishment is always a sanction and, therefore,
Judge Rapoport did not err in stating that his admonishment was
not a sanction.  We believe it was inconsistent for Judge Gardner
to have stated, on the one hand, that Magistrate Judge
Rapoport’s decision was neither erroneous nor contrary to law
and, on the other hand, to have overturned one of Judge
Rapoport’s legal conclusions.
Moreover, as we held in Snow Machines, Inc. v. Hedeo,
Inc., “it is simply improper for one judge to . . . conclude that
another judge did not intend to order what []he in fact ordered.” 
838 F.2d 718, 727 (3d Cir. 1988).  In Snow Machines, the
district court sanctioned a party for submitting to it an order
signed by a magistrate judge, determining that the magistrate’s
signature of the order was “an unintentional error.”  Id. at 727. 
In reversing, we observed:
Recognizing a power in one judge to conclude that
another judge did not intend to do what she in fact did is
fraught with danger. It opens a gaping hole in the
carefully constructed legal principles governing standards
of appellate review. A district judge may only set aside an
order of a magistrate concerning a nondispositive matter
where the order has been shown to be clearly erroneous or
contrary to law. If the district court may simply conclude
that the magistrate did not really intend to enter the order
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which she did, this limitation on the reviewing power is
illusory.
Id. 727-28 (citations omitted).
For these reasons, we conclude that Judge Gardner’s
ruling that Judge Rapoport’s admonishment was a sanction was
not a sound exercise of his discretion.  We will accordingly
vacate the March 30, 2006 Order.
V.
Conclusion
This case does not show the judicial system at its best,
and all members of this panel have been judges long enough to
know that it is not representative of the usual level of litigation
in the federal courts.  As we noted above, in light of the
settlement we see no basis to remand.  If there were a need to
remand, we would not hesitate to send this case back to Judge
Gardner, as we are satisfied that he would certainly be able to
preside impartially and decide the issues we have identified as
requiring further analysis and decision.  We deem Appellants’
suggestions to the contrary to be unfounded and wholly
inappropriate.
Because we have not delved into the merits of the dispute,
we are unaware of the  reasons why tensions ran higher than
usual in this case.  We recognize that all counsel were devoted to
their clients’ interests but devotion does not require stridency,
and we anticipate no repetition from the counsel involved.
For the reasons set forth, we will leave intact Judge
Gardner’s factual findings and credibility determinations, but we
will vacate both the March 30, 2006 and September 28, 2007
Sanctions Orders.
